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ABSTRACT
One plausible mechanism through which financial market shocks may propagate across countries
is through the effect of past gains and losses on investors' risk aversion. The paper first presents a
simple model examining how heterogeneous changes in investors' risk aversion affects portfolio
decisions and stock prices. Second, the paper shows empirically that, when funds' returns are below
average, they adjust their holdings toward the average (or benchmark) portfolio. In other words, they
tend to sell the assets of countries in which they were "overweight", increasing their exposure to
countries in which they were "underweight." Based on this insight, the paper discusses a matrix of
financial  interdependence  reflecting  the  extent  to  which  countries  share  overexposed  funds.
Comparing this measure to indices of trade or bank linkages indicates that our index can improve
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How do financial crises spread across countries?  As a result of the large number of currency and 
banking crises observed over the last decade, substantial research effort has been devoted to answering 
this question.  A growing consensus has emerged that financial linkages and frictions are likely to play 
a significant role in the propagation of shocks across countries. 
At a theoretical level, various authors have sought to explain international financial contagion 
effects with models of investor portfolio choice.  Schinasi and Smith (2000) highlight that contagion 
effects can be the result of simple portfolio rebalancing within a mean-variance or VaR framework.  In 
Kodres and Pritsker (2002), differentially informed investors transmit idiosyncratic shocks from one 
market to others by rebalancing their portfolios’ exposures to common macroeconomic risks.  Kyle and 
Xiong (2001) model contagion as a wealth effect in a model with two risky assets and different types of 
traders.  Wealth effects as a source of contagion also figure prominently in the models of Goldstein and 
Pauzner (2001) and Yuan (2004).  In a different approach, Calvo and Mendoza (2000) describe fund 
managers’ investment decisions using a mean-variance framework with short-selling constraints, 
including fixed costs of information acquisition about countries and assuming that fund managers’ 
performance schemes create incentives against deviating too much from benchmark indices. 
Empirically, there are also some indications that financial links matter.  Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(2000), Hernández and Valdés (2001), Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001), and Caramazza, Ricci, and 
Salgado (2000) provide evidence that if two countries borrow from banks located in a common third 
country, crises are transmitted more easily.  However, they do not directly identify the particular 
mechanism accounting for this phenomenon.  Providing empirical support for Calvo’s and Mendoza’s 
model, Disyatat and Gelos (2001) show that emerging market funds’ asset allocation can be well 
approximated by model with short-sale constraints and mean-variance optimization around benchmark 
indices.  Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2003) provide evidence that bank exposures to crisis countries 
can help predict flows to third countries after the Mexican and Asian crises.  None of these studies, 
however, has used cross-sectional information in portfolio positions at the micro level to identify the 
exact nature of financial linkages.  For example, the studies stressing common lender effects through 
banks are based on aggregate information on bank positions, as reported by the BIS.
1  
                                                 




In this paper, we study the trading behavior of emerging market mutual funds and its role in the 
transmission of shocks across countries.  We take advantage of a large database of emerging market 
funds that contains disaggregated information on the investments of hundreds of funds.  For each fund, 
the database contains monthly data on its asset allocation by country for the period January 1996 
through December 2000.  This detailed information allows us to characterize the behavior of 
international investors to a greater extent than was possible in previous studies.  Although we focus on 
a particular type of investor, their behavior is likely representative of other types of investors as well.  
Importantly, the portfolio allocation of mutual funds is heterogeneous.  This heterogeneity implies not 
only that funds are affected to different extents during crises, but also that the resulting portfolio 
reallocations transmit the crisis to some countries more than others. 
We present a simple model that analyzes the effect of changes in investors’ risk aversion on 
portfolio decisions and stock prices.  The model incorporates three main ingredients: (i) investors hold 
heterogeneous portfolios and may differ in their levels of risk aversion, (ii) changes in an investor's 
level of risk aversion affect his portfolio decisions, and (iii) portfolio decisions affect stock prices.  The 
model shows that, if an investor cares about his performance relative to that of other investors, in 
response to an increase in risk aversion he would shift his portfolio towards the average portfolio.  
Namely, he would sell assets of countries to which he is “overexposed,” and buy assets of countries to 
which he is “underexposed.”  The model also shows how crises may be transmitted through the 
interaction of risk aversion and heterogeneous portfolios.  Since crises affect most those investors who 
are most exposed to the crisis country and those investors, in turn, adjust their portfolios away from 
other countries in which they are overexposed, crises are transmitted through common overexposed 
investors.
2 
In the empirical analysis, we first examine the effect of gains and losses on investors’ portfolios.  
Consistent with the model, we find that when the returns of a fund are low relative to the returns of 
other funds, it tends to reduce its weight in countries in which it was overexposed and increase its 
weight in countries in which it was underexposed, thereby adjusting its portfolio in the direction of the 
average portfolio.  We interpret these results as suggesting that past performance has an effect on funds 
                                                 
2 In the model, investors care about both absolute returns and returns in excess of those of other investors.  The model is 
related to, but simpler than, models in which investors’ utility is a decreasing function of the variance of their excess returns 




risk aversion, and that changes in risk aversion affect fund portfolios in the direction predicted by the 
model.
3,4 
Next, we construct a time-varying matrix of financial interdependence, based on the extent to 
which countries share overexposed funds.  We examine whether during the Thai, Russian, and 
Brazilian crises, our measure of financial interdependence helps explain the degree to which stock 
markets fell across the world.  There is a negative correlation between countries’ stock market 
performance during these crises and the degree to which these countries shared overexposed funds with 
the crisis country.  The effect of financial interdependence index remains significant in various cases 
even after controlling for trade or bank linkages.  This suggests that policymakers could benefit from 
closely monitoring the micro composition of investments across funds in order to predict and possibly 
avert contagion effects. 
These findings may also have interesting implications for understanding momentum trading at the 
country level.  The fact that, in response to below-average overall performance, funds tend to reduce 
their investments in countries in which they are overexposed can account for the observation that, in 
the aggregate, funds reduce their investments in countries in which returns are low (positive-feedback 
trading).
5  The reason is that when returns in a country are low, funds that are overexposed to that 
country tend to have below-average gains.  As a result, they reduce their exposure to all countries in 
which they are overexposed, including the affected country.  Likewise, the funds whose gains are 
above average further reduce their exposure to countries in which they are underexposed, including the 




In this section, we present a stylized model to help in the interpretation of our empirical results on fund 
behavior and the transmission of crises.  We present a simple model that incorporates the main 
                                                 
3 Such changes in risk aversion may result from a wealth effect or be due to compensation schemes for managers that 
strongly penalize losses in excess of the industry average, such as hypothesized in Calvo and Mendoza (2000).  There is a 
substantial literature examining the risk-taking behavior of domestic U.S. fund managers in response to prior performance 
(see Chevalier and Ellison, 1996, Brown, Harlow, and Starks, 1996, and Daniel and Wermers, 2000, among many others).  
Although this is not the focus of our paper, a discussion of these issues is provided in Appendix I.  More generally, changes 
in risk aversion by investors have occasionally been cited as a possible source of contagion.  See, for example, Kumar and 
Persaud (2001). 
4 Broner, Lorenzoni, and Schmukler (2003) show that the behavior of the term structure of emerging market sovereign 
bonds suggests that investors’ risk aversion increases during crises. 
5 Among others, Borensztein and Gelos (2003a), Kaminsky, Lyons, and Schmukler (2000), and Froot, O’Connell, and 




ingredients of our story: investors hold heterogeneous portfolios and may differ in their levels of risk 
aversion, changes in an investor's level of risk aversion affect his portfolio decisions, and portfolio 
decisions affect stock prices.
6 
We assume that investors hold different portfolios because they have different beliefs about 
expected dividends.  Investors agree to disagree, in the sense that they choose to ignore the beliefs of 
other investors even though these may be reflected in prices.
7  We also assume that investors are risk 
averse and may differ in their levels of risk aversion.
8  The existence of heterogeneity across these two 
dimensions, beliefs and risk aversion, are necessary to show how a change in an investor's risk aversion 
affects his portfolio decisions.  The mechanism works through the interaction of risk aversion and 
beliefs:  we show that an increase in an investor's risk aversion leads to a desire to shift his portfolio 
away from countries about which he is relatively optimistic, and towards those about which he is 
relatively pessimistic.
9 
However, the effect of demand shifts on actual portfolio adjustments and asset prices depend on 
the supply of assets faced by investors.  We consider two polar cases.  At one extreme, we consider the 
case in which the supply of assets is completely inelastic.  In this case, the price of the assets adjusts so 
that, in equilibrium, total asset demand equals the fixed asset supply.  At the other extreme, we 
consider the case in which the supply of assets is completely elastic.  In this case, the quantities of 
assets adjust so that in equilibrium their prices are constant.   
Which assumption is more plausible empirically? In the empirical section, we will be using 
monthly data and focusing on relatively high frequency effects, and this may suggest that it is more 
reasonable to assume that the supply of assets be quite inelastic. On the other hand, the effective supply 
of assets faced by global mutual funds may be increasing in the price they are willing to pay both 
because the actual supply of assets may be somewhat elastic even in the short run, and also because the 
                                                 
6 Providing a fully-fledged theoretical analysis is outside the scope of this paper and, as a result, we leave out some relevant 
ingredients.  In particular, we take risk aversion levels as exogenous parameters, and analyze the effect of changes in risk 
aversion by performing comparative statics on these parameters. 
7 There exist several models of asset pricing in which investors agree to disagree, especially in the bubbles literature.  See 
for example Harrison and Kreps (1978), Scheinkman and Xiong (2003), and Hong and Stein (2003).  There may be other 
reasons why investors hold different portfolios.  For example, countries may differ in the volatility of dividends, or the 
correlation between a country’s dividends and investors’ marginal utility may be different for different investors.  We chose 
to assume differences in beliefs for simplicity.   
8 To be able to solve the model analytically, we consider the case of CARA preferences and normally distributed dividends, 
as in Calvo and Mendoza (1999), Kodres and Prisker (2002), and Yuan (2004). 
9 We assume that there exists heterogeneity in investors' beliefs and risk aversion, but investors are otherwise similar.  Other 
papers assume the existence of different classes of investors, but homogeneity within each class.  For example, Kodres and 
Prisker (2002) assume the existence of informed investors, uninformed investors, and noise traders, while Kyle and Xiong 




demand by other investors not captured in the model may be somewhat elastic.
10  While the model is a 
general equilibrium one, in the empirical section we will focus on a particular class of foreign 
investors, neglecting the role of other, in particular, domestic agents. In that context, assuming an 




There are two periods.  In period 1 investors purchase assets and in period 2 they consume.  Investors 
can invest in three assets:  two countries which pay stochastic dividends  1 D  and  2 D  in period 2 (and 
have zero residual value), and a safe asset with gross return 1.  There are two investors (fund 
managers),  { } 2 , 1 Î i .  Investor i's utility is CARA with coefficient of absolute risk aversion  i g . We use 
this assumption to allow us to derive simple closed-form solutions, although a utility function where 
risk aversion explicitly depended on wealth would be more desirable for our purposes. 
Professional fund managers are typically judged relative to their peers.  Therefore, we assume that 
an investor values his own period 2 wealth  i W¢ and also the difference between his wealth and that of 
the other investor  i W-¢ . 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) i i i i W W W
i e U
- ¢ - ¢ + ¢ - - - =
a a g 1 , 
 
where a  measures the degree to which investors care about relative returns as opposed to absolute 
returns
11.  In period 1, investors allocate their wealth  i W¢ between each of the two countries and the 
safe asset. 
The dividends  1 D  and  2 D  are stochastic.  Investor 1 is relatively optimistic about country 1 and 
relatively pessimistic about country 2, while investor 2 is relatively optimistic about country 2 and 
relatively pessimistic about country 1.  In particular, 
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10 The papers by Calvo and Mendoza (1999) and Schinasi and Smith (2000) take returns as exogenous, which is analogous 
to assuming a perfectly elastic supply of assets and exogenous prices.  The papers by Kodres and Pritsker (2002), Yuan 
(2004), and Kyle and Xiong (2001) assume a perfectly inelastic supply of assets, so that returns and prices are endogenous 
but quantities are exogenous. 





L H D D > .  The correlation between  1 D  and  2 D  is 0.
12,13 
We now calculate the demand for the two risky assets by each investor.  Let  c P  denote the price of 
country c shares in period 1, and  c i X ,  the number of country c shares held by investor i.  Wealth 








c c c i i i P D X W W . 
 
Given the properties of CARA preferences and the fact that ( ) ( ) i i i i i W W W W W - - ¢ - ¢ = ¢ - ¢ + ¢ - a a a 1  is 
normally distributed, it is easy to show that investor i maximizes 
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where the subindices i in the expectation and variance operators refer to the fact that they are 
calculated based on investor i's beliefs about dividends.  It is easy to show that the expectation and 
variance terms equal 
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There are four first order conditions, one per investor per country.  They are 
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¶
,  (3) 
                                                 
12 Since we are only concerned with the pricing and investor portfolios in period 1, the actual probability distribution of the 
dividends is irrelevant. 
13 The model can be easily extended to many investors, many countries, and non-zero correlations.  However, apart from 








2 0 X X P D
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¶
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The first order conditions are easy to interpret.  Other things equal, an investor prefers to invest in 
the country about which he is relatively optimistic.  However, when an investor cares about relative 
returns ( 0 > a ), he has an incentive not to choose a portfolio very different from that of the other 
investor.  This later effect is relatively more important the more risk averse the investor is. 
We now turn to the supply of assets. We consider the two polar cases of perfectly inelastic supply 
(fixed quantities) and perfectly elastic supply (fixed prices). 
 
2.2 Inelastic supply 
 
Let the (fixed) number of country i shares be denoted by  i K .  As a result, the market clearing 
conditions for the two assets are 
 
  1 , 2 1 , 1 1 X X K + = ,  (5) 
  2 , 2 2 , 1 2 X X K + = .  (6) 
 
Equations (1) through (6) form a system of 6 linear equations and 6 unknowns:  1 P ,  2 P ,  1 , 1 X ,  2 , 1 X , 
1 , 2 X ,  2 , 2 X .  After some straightforward algebra, we get 
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- = ,  (12) 
 
Share prices in the two countries,  1 P  and  2 P , are equal to their average expected dividend, 
( ) 2
L H D D + , plus two additional terms.  The first term is due to the fact that, since the assets are 
risky, they need to pay a premium for investors to hold them.  This effect is stronger the higher the 
variance of dividends 
2 s , the higher the quantity of assets  i K , the higher the levels of risk aversion  i g , 
and the less investors care about relative returns (low a ). 
The second term is the most important result of the model.  It shows that asset prices reflect the 
beliefs of the investors that are relatively less risk averse more than those of the investors that are 
relatively more risk averse.  In other words, if investor i is less risk averse than investor  i -  the 
country about which investor i is relatively optimistic will tend to have a higher price than the country 
about which investor i is relatively pessimistic.  The intuition is that very risk averse investors tend not 
to act that much on their beliefs.  So the demand for the countries about which risk averse investors are 
optimistic is low: optimistic investors do not want to face the risk, and pessimistic investors are not 
interested.  Since the supply is inelastic, this lower demand is reflected in lower prices.  The opposite is 
true about countries whose optimistic investors are not very risk averse.  The transmission mechanism 
proposed in this paper hinges on this interaction between risk aversion and beliefs. 
With respect to asset allocations, each investor holds one half of each country's shares,  2 i K , plus 
fractions given in two additional terms.  The first term is due to the fact that the less risk averse 
investor will tend to hold more of each of the two assets.  The second term reflects the fact that each 
investor will invest more in the country about which he is relatively optimistic and less in the country 
about which he is relatively pessimistic. 
Let  ( ) 2 , 1 , , , i i c i c i X X X b + º  be investor i's country c weight, defined as the share of total 
investment in both countries that is invested in country c.  The fact that an investor tends to invest 
more than other investors in the countries he is relatively optimistic about is reflected in the fact that 
1 , 2 1 , 1 b b >  and  2 , 2 2 , 1 b b <  for all parameter values.
14 
                                                 
14 This can be easily shown by noting that  i i i i b b , , - >  when  1 = a ,  0 , < a d b d i i , and  0 , > - a d b d i i . Then, it must also be 




We can now describe how crises are transmitted across countries in this environment.  Assume that 
risk aversion depends on past performance. Also assume that investors care about relative returns 
(positive a ), so that their risk aversion depends not only on past absolute returns but also on past 
returns in excess of those of other investors.
15  Assume that there is a crisis in a third country in which 
investor 1 is more heavily invested because he is relatively more optimistic about that country.  As a 
result of the crisis, investor 1 becomes more risk averse, both because he suffered absolute losses and 
because his losses are higher than those of investor 2.  Investor 2 may or may not become more risk 
averse.  If he cared mostly about relative returns, he would become less risk averse after suffering 
lower losses than investor 1.  If he cared mostly about absolute returns, he would become more risk 
averse, but less so than investor 1.  As a result, the crisis leads to an increase in  2 1 g g - .  From 
equations (7) and (8), we see that the price of country 1 shares would fall by a larger amount than those 
of country 2.  Intuitively, the risk aversion of the average investor increases in country 1 more than it 
does in country 2. 
The model predicts that the crisis should be transmitted to a larger extent to the country that shares 
optimistic investors with the crisis country.  Empirically, it is difficult to measure investor optimism.  
However, from equations (9) through (12) we see that optimism is reflected in higher country 
exposures.  As a result, the model predicts that crises should affect to a greater extent countries that 
share overexposed investors with the crisis country. 
When the supply of assets is perfectly inelastic, the model does not have strong predictions on 
portfolio adjustments in response to past investor performance.  Equations (9) through (12) show that 
more risk averse investors invest less in both countries, but there is no interaction between differences 
in risk aversion and differences in optimism.  The reason is that while changes in risk aversion lead to 
changes in asset demand, asset prices adjust so that investors end up holding the fixed quantity of 
assets.  To study the behavior of investors' portfolios, we study next the case in which the supply of 
assets is perfectly elastic. 
 
2.3 Elastic supply 
 
Let the (fixed) price of country i shares be denoted by  i P .  As a result, the market clearing 
conditions (5) and (6) are replaced by 
                                                 
15 It would be useful to build a model in which risk aversion is endogenously determined as a function of past performance.  





  1 1 P P = ,  (13) 
  2 2 P P = .  (14) 
 
Replacing the prices in equations (1) through (4), we get a system of 4 linear equations and 4 
unknowns:  1 , 1 X ,  2 , 1 X ,  1 , 2 X ,  2 , 2 X .  After some straightforward algebra, we get 
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An investor's portfolio decisions are driven by two effects, reflected in the two terms in the second 
factor.  First, he wants to invest relatively more in the country he is optimistic about.  This effect is 
stronger the larger the difference between the expected dividend (given his beliefs) and the country 
price, and weaker the higher his level of risk aversion.  Second, he wants to invest in the country where 
the other investor is investing.  This effect is stronger the higher the weight on relative performance a .  
In addition, the first factor shows that the lower the volatility of dividends and the more investors care 
about relative performance, the more they invest in all countries.
16  
We now turn to study the properties of country weights when the supply of assets is elastic.  In 
order for country weights to be meaningful, we need to make an additional assumption that guarantees 
that the total investment in the two countries,  2 , 1 , i i X X + , is positive for both investors.  It is easy to 
show that  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 2 2 2 1 > - + + - + P D D P D D
L H L H  is a necessary and sufficient condition for this 
to be the case.  This condition is quite reasonable and it just states that the average country risk 
premium is positive.  As in the case of inelastic supply of assets, the fact that an investor tends to invest 
                                                 




more than other investors in the countries he is relatively optimistic about is reflected in the fact that 
1 , 2 1 , 1 b b >  and  2 , 2 2 , 1 b b <  for all parameter values.
17 
How do investors' country weights respond to changes in risk aversion?  In the case of a perfectly 
inelastic supply of assets, we showed above that changes in risk aversion do not have clear effects on 
portfolios, since changes in asset demand are reflected in prices but not in quantities.  This is no longer 
the case when the quantity of assets can respond to changes in asset demand.  In particular, what is the 
effect of an increase in the risk aversion of investor i,  i g , on the portfolio of each investor?  It is easy 
to show that 
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Namely, the investor whose risk aversion increases, decreases his weight in the country he is 
relatively optimistic about and increases it in the country he is relatively pessimistic about.  The other 
investor increases his weight in the country he is optimistic about and decreases it in the country he is 
pessimistic about.  The intuition behind these results is straightforward.  The increase in risk aversion 
makes investor i want to move his portfolio closer to that of investor  i - .  Since  i i i i b b , , - >  and 
i i i i b b - - - < , , , this implies a shift from country i to country  i - .  In turn, since investor  i - 's country 
weights also reflect an incentive not to have a portfolio very different from that of investor i, he 
responds to the shift in investor i's portfolio by shifting his own portfolio in the same direction.
18 
What are the predictions of the model regarding portfolio adjustments as a result of past 
performance?  As in the case of inelastic supply, we assume that risk aversion increases when investors' 
past performance is weak.  As a result, the model predicts that in response to past relative and absolute 
losses, investors should decrease (increase) their weight in countries in which their weight was higher 
(lower) than that of other investors.  In other words, investors should move towards the average 
investor's portfolio by decreasing their exposure to countries in which they were overexposed and 
increasing their exposure to countries in which they were underexposed.  In the case of relative and 
absolute gains, investors should move away from the average investor's portfolio by increasing their 
                                                 
17 This can be easily shown by noting that  i i i i b b , 1 , 1 lim lim - ® ® = a a ,  0 , < a d b d i i , and  0 , > - a d b d i i .  Then, the 
inequality must be true for  [ ) 1 , 0 Î a .  Note that we are not saying that  i i i i b b - > , , . 




exposure to countries in which they were overexposed and decreasing their exposure to countries in 
which they were underexposed. 
Note that the effect of relative performance on investors' portfolios is reinforced by a positive 
feedback mechanism.  If investor i suffers higher losses than investor  i - , he should move towards the 
average portfolio.  But investor  i -  should move away from the average portfolio both because his 
relative performance was positive and also because the adjustment by investor i shifts the average 
portfolio in the direction of investor  i - 's portfolio.  This adjustment by investor  i -  shifts the average 
portfolio away from investor i's, which gives investor i incentives to adjust his portfolio even further 
from his initial portfolio.  And so forth.  As a result, we should expect relative performance to affect 
investors' portfolios more than would be suggested by the weight of relative performance in investors' 
utilities a . 
 
2.4 Model predictions 
 
In sections 2.3 and 2.4, we studied separately the cases of perfectly inelastic and perfectly elastic asset 
supply.  Under perfectly inelastic supply, we derived predictions for the transmission of crises, since in 
this case shifts in the demand for assets only have effects on asset prices.  Under perfectly elastic 
supply, we derived predictions for portfolio adjustments, since in this case shifts in the demand for 
assets only have effects on the quantity of assets.  As mentioned above, in reality the supply of assets 
faced by global mutual funds is likely neither perfectly elastic nor perfectly inelastic. In such an 
intermediate case, there would be both effects on asset prices and investors' portfolios as predicted in 
the cases of perfectly inelastic and perfectly elastic asset supply, respectively, although the effects 
would be quantitatively smaller.
19 
In the following sections we test the two main predictions of the model.  First, we study whether 
poor past performance leads investors to “retrench” towards the average portfolio.  We do so by 
regressing changes in country weights on the interaction of past performance and country 
overexposure.  The model predicts a positive coefficient, as negative performance should lead to a 
decrease in the exposure to countries in which the fund is overexposed.  Second, we test whether a 
crisis in one country is transmitted to a greater extent to countries that share overexposed investors with 
                                                 
19 It is possible to solve analytically the same model with a supply of assets that is increasing in the price level (as long as 
the supply is linear in the price).  However, we preferred to analyze separately the two extreme cases in which the slope is 




the crisis country.  We do this by constructing a matrix of financial exposure that reflects such 




The mutual fund data used in this paper are from a comprehensive database purchased from 
eMergingPortfolio.com.  The database covers, on a monthly basis, the geographic asset allocation of 
hundreds of equity funds with a focus on emerging markets for the period 1996:1-2000:12.  The funds 
are domiciled in different countries around the world.  At the beginning of the sample, the database 
contains 382 funds with assets totaling US$117 billion.  At the end of the sample, the number of funds 
is 639, with US$120 billion in assets.  While the total number of funds increased over the period, some 
funds were dropped from the database if they discontinued providing information on their holdings.  
We focus on global dedicated emerging funds, i.e. funds that invest in emerging markets worldwide.
20  
For stock market returns, we used monthly IFC US$ total returns for the period 1990-2000, 
complementing them whenever needed with data from MSCI or national sources. 
In December 2000, the subsample consisted of 117 global emerging market funds.  Approximately 
one quarter of the funds are closed-end funds.  The assets of these funds represent a modest, but not 
negligible fraction of the total market capitalization in the countries they invest.  For example, in the 
case of Argentina, funds held approximately 2.7 percent of the total stock market capitalization in 
August of 1998, while the share was around 1.3 percent for Korea.  
While precise numbers on total equity flows are hard to obtain, a substantial fraction of all equity 
flows to emerging markets seems to occur through the funds in our database.  According to the World 
Bank (2003), in 1998, total portfolio equity flows to developing countries amounted to US$7.4 billion, 
compared to US$ 0.8 billion flows recorded in our sample.  
The providing company aims for the widest coverage possible of emerging market funds without 
applying any selection criteria.  According to the provider, the complete database covers roughly 80 
percent of all dedicated emerging market funds, with a coverage of about 90 percent of total emerging 
market fund assets.  We do not have data on holdings of individual stocks or on the timing of funds’ 
purchases and sales over the month.  We calculate the implied flows from the asset position data, 
                                                 
20 For more details on the data, see Borensztein and Gelos (2003a).  Kaminsky, Lyons and Schmukler (2001) also examine 




assuming that within countries, funds hold a portfolio that is well proxied by the IFC US$ total return 
investable index.
21  We also assume that flows occur halfway through the month. 
 
4. Portfolio dispersion over time 
 
To obtain a first impression of the data, in this section we compute the dispersion of fund portfolios 
over time.  We measure dispersion as the root mean squared distance over country weights between 
each fund and the average portfolio, where the average portfolio is weighted by fund size.  Figure 1 
shows the median of this dispersion for the group of global funds, together with the cumulated mean 
fund returns (set equal to 100 at the beginning of the sample).  The picture shows that fund portfolios 
started converging during the Asian crises, at the same time that funds started facing large portfolio 
losses.  This suggests that during turbulent times, funds retrench towards the average.  However, 
improvements in performance after the Russian crisis were not accompanied by an increase in fund 
dispersion.  In the next section, we examine in detail how fund portfolio choices depend on their 
performance.  We show that funds do retrench towards the mean during periods of low returns, but they 
react to returns relative to those of other funds as opposed to absolute returns.  This distinction has 
important implications for the transmission of shocks during crises, since relative returns are very 
sensitive to whether funds are overexposed to crisis centers. 
 
                                                 



































































































































      Note: Distance from average portfolio is the median portfolio distance from the mean portfolio. 
The mean portfolio is weighted by fund size. The distance is measured as the root mean squared  
difference over country weights.  Based on global funds only. 
 
5. Fund performance and portfolio choice 
 
This section analyzes the trading behavior of emerging market mutual funds.  We concentrate on the 
effect of portfolio returns – both absolute and relative to the average portfolio – on funds portfolio 
decisions.  For this purpose, we regress changes in portfolio weights (one observation per fund-
country-date) on overexposure, excess gains (or losses), gains, and the interactions of excess gains and 
gains with overexposure.  We find that, as predicted by the model, when fund returns are lower than 
that of the average portfolio, funds reduce their exposure to countries in which they were “overweight” 
and increase their exposure to countries in which they were “underweight 
Let sub-indices i denote fund, c country, and t time.  Let ai,c,t denote assets and  t c r ,  the stock index 
return.  Let  ∑ =
c t c i t i a s , , ,  denote the size of a mutual fund,  t i t c i t c i s a b , , , , , =  its country weight, and  t c b ,  
the average (weighted by fund size) country weights across funds.  Let overexposure  t c i oe , , , fund gains 
t i g , , and fund excess gains exgi,t be defined as 
 




  ∑ - =
c
t c t c i t i r b g , 1 , , , , 
  ∑ - - =
c
t c t c t i t i r b g exg , 1 , , , . 
 
The change in country weight,  t c i db , , , is given by 
 
  1 , , , , , , - - = t c i t c i t c i b b db . 
 
It is not clear that we should focus on  t c i db , ,  as a measure of portfolio adjustment by funds.  For 
example, if the market capitalization of a country as a fraction of total world market capitalization 
changed, one would expect that, on average, mutual funds’ country weights would adjust as well.  In 
particular, it is obvious that it would not be possible for all investors (mutual funds and others) to keep 
a constant country weight. 
At one extreme, if the supply of assets were totally inelastic market capitalization would change 
proportionately to country returns  t c r , .
22  As a result, even if funds acted passively without buying or 
selling shares, the country weight would change by an amount
23 
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In this case, one would want to use an “adjusted” change in weights,  t c i b d , , ¢ , that solely captured the 
change in weights that arose from funds actively buying and selling assets, 
 
  t c i t c i t c i adj db b d , , , , , , - = ¢ .  (20) 
 
From the discussion in section 2.2, we see that share prices and expected returns would adjust in order 
to keep investors content holding the resulting portfolio.  For example, if in one country returns are 
lower than average, we would expect share prices not to fall proportionately as much as expected 
                                                 
22 This would not be exactly true if firms paid dividends.  However, at monthly frequencies dividends are not an important 
fraction of returns, especially for emerging markets. 
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dividends, since the expected returns need to fall to keep investors from wanting to reestablish their 
prior country weights. 
At the other extreme, if the supply of assets were totally elastic expected returns would remain 
constant and, thus, we would expect funds to keep constant country weights.  In this case, one would 
want to use the unadjusted change in weights,  t c i db , , , in the regressions.  Finally, for intermediate cases 
one would want to adjust  t c i db , , , but by less than in equation (20). 
We run the following regression 
 
t c i t i t c i t i t c i t c i t c i exg oe exg adj oe db , , , 1 , , , , , 1 , , , , e d g b a + × × + × + × + × = - - . 
 
The first term captures possible mean reversion in portfolios.  The role of the second term should 
be clear from the discussion above.  We run three types of regressions: one constraining  b  to be 1 
which corresponds to the case of perfectly inelastic supply, one constraining b  to be 0 which 
corresponds to the case of perfectly elastic supply, and one in which b  is unconstrained, letting the 
regression tell us what the appropriate adjustment term is. 
If our hypothesis were true, fund i should increase its weight on country c ( t c i db , ,  positive) if the 
fund was overexposed to country c ( 1 , , - t c i oe  positive) when the fund is doing relatively well (exgi,t 
positive).  Likewise, the fund should increase its weight on country c ( t c i db , ,  positive) if the fund was 
underexposed to country c ( 1 , , - t c i oe  negative) when the fund is doing relatively badly (exgi,t negative).  
As a result, we focus on the coefficient d , which should be positive according to our hypothesis. 
Funds indeed tend to buy into countries in which they are overexposed (underexposed) when their 
gains are higher (lower) than that of other funds. Tables 1.a and 1.b summarize our results for the three 
cases in which  1 º b ,  0 º b , and b  is unconstrained.
24  We report results including excess gains as 
well as gains to determine whether funds care more about relative or absolute performance.  In all 
cases, the coefficient d  is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level.  There is also a 
significant reversion to the mean in the sense that on average funds buy into countries were they are 
                                                 
24 We restricted the sample to countries that represent at least 1% of average fund portfolio.  We observed that we could 
explain portfolio adjustments for large countries better than for small countries.  One possible explanation is that the index 






25  It is interesting to note that excess gains seem to be more important than absolute 
gains, both in levels and when interacted with overexposure.  When including absolute gains, the 
interaction term of lagged overexposure and absolute gains is small and not always significant.  Finally, 
when unconstrained, the coefficient on the adjustment term is always significantly greater than 0 and 
significantly lower than 1, suggesting that indeed mutual funds face neither a perfectly elastic nor a 
perfectly inelastic supply of assets. 
The economic significance of the effect of funds’ relative performance on whether or not they 
retrench to the benchmark is moderate, but by no means negligible.  For example, consider a country in 
which half the funds (weighted by fund size) invest 15% of their assets and half the funds invest 5% of 
their assets, so that the former have overexposure of +5% and the latter of –5%.  Assume that the first 
group of funds has losses of 10% while the second group has gains of 10.  According to the results in 
Table 1.a (unconstrained  b ), both groups of funds would reduce their weight in the country by 0.44%.  
In addition, the first group of funds will now manage 0.5*90% of total fund assets while the second 
group of funds will correspond to 0.5*110% of total fund assets.  As a result, the average weight of the 
country in total fund assets would drop from 10% to 9.07%, which implies that total funds’ investment 
in the country would drop by almost 10%.  In addition, the 10% drop in funds’ investment in the 
country would take place despite the fact that the expected returns in the country would have increased, 
since the supply of assets is not perfectly elastic. 
We have also run regressions including control variables.  There, we added variables such as 
changes in risk as reported by the International Country Risk Guide; we included such control variables 
independently and as interactions with lagged excess gains.  While many of these variables helped to 
improve the fit of our regressions, none significantly reduced the importance of the channel stressed 
here.  The results are reported in Appendix II.
26 
                                                 
25 Of course, this does not mean that there is a trend and that over time funds are getting closer to the mean. 
26 In an earlier version, we also looked at the differences between open-end and closed-end funds.  We found that the two 
types of funds behave similarly.  The coefficient d  was always positive and significant at the 1% level, and its magnitude 









( 1 º b ) 
Assuming perfectly 
elastic supply 
 ( 0 º b ) 
No assumption on 
supply elasticity 
 (b  unconstrained) 
adjustment term  1  0  0.436
*** 
(0.007) 





























Observations  40,946  38,353  38,353 
2 R   0.02  0.02  0.12 
 
Notes:  Dependent variable: change in country weight, as defined in equation (20).  




* means statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
 
 














































































































Observations  40,946  40,946  38,353  38,353  38,353  38,353 
2 R   0.02  0.01  0.03  0.02  0.12  0.12 
 
Notes:  Dependent variable: change in country weight, as defined in equation (20). One 








6. A measure of financial interdependence  
 
The results in the previous section suggest that the effect of crises on fund flows depends on funds’ 
degree of overexposure to the crisis country.  In particular, since the funds that were overexposed to the 
crisis country are likely to have larger losses than those that were underexposed, we should expect 
those funds to take capital out of the countries in which they were overexposed and into the countries in 
which they were underexposed. 
In this section we construct a matrix of financial interdependence between countries based on 
whether countries share overexposed investors.  We define country c1’s reliance on fund i,  t i c re , , 1 , as 
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t c i t i c t c c oe re d , , , , , , 2 1 2 1 ,   
 
namely, the sum of every fund’s overexposure to country  2 c , weighted by  1 c ’s reliance on each fund.  
For short, we also refer to  t c c d , , 2 1  as country  1 c ’s exposure to country  2 c .  The relationship between this 
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where  ∑ =
i i s S , the sum of the assets of all funds (see Appendix III for details).  As shown in section 
5, a fund should reduce its investments in country  1 c  in response to low excess gains if that fund is 
overexposed to country c1.  This explains why the exposure measure is related to the correlation 




that the effect of a given reduction in funds investments in country  1 c  will depend on the size of that 
reduction relative to total investments in the country.  That is why the exposure measure is not 
symmetric,  t c c t c c d d , , , , 1 2 2 1 ¹ .  Note that this does not mean that small countries are, in general, more 
exposed to crises, since funds overexposure to small countries tends to be small.  On the other hand, it 
is true that countries, in general, have low exposures to small countries.
27 
 
7. Financial interdependence and contagion 
 
We have shown that, on average, funds take their capital out of countries that rely heavily on funds 
overexposed to crisis countries.  Does this mean that the matrix of financial exposure can predict which 
countries are likely to be affected by contagion?  In particular, in this section we study whether the 
degree of financial exposures to crisis countries can help explain the cross-section of stock returns 
during crises.  Given that we are examining only a subset of international investors, a positive finding 
could be interpreted as an indication that mutual funds are representative of international investors in 
general. 
We find that our index of financial exposure helps explain the pattern of cross-country stock 
market movements during the Thai, Russian and Brazilian crises (Table 2a).
28  For the three crises, we 
run three separate regressions of stock market returns on exposure restricting the sample to countries 
that represent at least 1%, 2%, and 3% of average fund portfolio respectively.
29  For all crises, the 
coefficient on the financial exposure variable is negative and statistically significant.  For the Thai 
crisis, the financial exposure variable is significant at the 1% level.  Furthermore, the exposure variable 
explains between 28% and 52% of the cross-sectional variation in country returns.  For the Russian 
crisis, the financial exposure variable is significant at the 5% level and explains 15% of the cross-
                                                 
27 This index only takes into account “direct” links.  Higher order links can be calculated estimating first the effect of the 
direct link, adding higher order terms discounted using this estimated effect, and iterating. 
28 The crisis dates were chosen as follows:  In Thailand, difficulties were apparent since the beginning of 1997, the currency 
was devalued in June, and the biggest drop in the stock market took place in August.  As a result, for the Thai crisis we 
study accumulated stock market returns during the period April 1997 – August 1997.  In Russia, interest rates on T-bills 
increased substantially in July 1998, the default took place in August, and the large drops in the stock market took place in 
August and September.  As a result, for the Russian crisis we study accumulated stock market returns during the period July 
1998 – September 1998.  In Brazil, it is difficult to pinpoint to a start of the crisis, as pressure started mounting beginning 
with the Russian default.  As a result, for the Brazilian crisis we study the returns during January 1999, the month when 
both the devaluation and the largest stock market drop took place. 
29 We observed that the index of financial interdependence explains returns in large countries better than in small countries.  





sectional variation in country returns.  However, it loses significance when restricting the regression to 
countries with weights higher than 3%, although this regression only has 9 observations.  For the 
Brazilian crisis, the financial exposure variable is significant at the 10% level for countries with 
weights greater than 1%.  In addition, both significance and explanatory power increase, as the sample 
is restricted to larger countries.  For countries with weights greater than 3%, the exposure variable 
explains 45% of the cross-sectional variation in stock returns. 
 
Table 2a. Stock market returns during crises 
 
Thailand  Russia  Brazil 
 






















2  0.28  0.52  0.52  0.15  0.09  0.06  0.08  0.20  0.45 
No. of obs.  19  14  12  19  15  9  21  14  10 
 
Notes:  Stock market returns as a function of a country’s exposure to crisis countries.  The Thai crisis regression 
corresponds to cumulative returns during April 1997—August 1997, the Russian crisis regression to July 1998—September 
1998, and the Brazilian crisis regression to January 1999.  Weight refers to the minimum weight of a country in the average 




* means statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.  Robust standard 
errors are shown in parentheses.  
 
Figure 2 illustrates the effect of exposure on returns, restricting the sample to countries with 
weights greater than 1%.  First, it seems clear that the results are not due to outliers.  Second, it shows 
that focusing on financial exposure, we can explain why some countries with no other obvious links to 
the crisis country suffered contagion, while others that ex-ante might have seemed connected did not.  
During the Thai crisis, among the Asian countries Taiwan was relatively unaffected, perhaps due to the 
fact that it did not share overexposed investors with Thailand.  Malaysia, on the other hand, was the 
country most affected and also the country most exposed.  During the Brazilian crisis, Argentina was 
the country most exposed and also one of the 3 with lowest returns and the lowest among Latin-
American countries.  In addition, both among European countries and among Asian countries, those 













exposure to crisis country
































exposure to crisis country





































exposure to crisis country



























Next, we examine the importance of two important control variables, adding them one at a time to 
each regression (Table 2b).  First, the presence of trade linkages is an important candidate for 
explaining the pattern of financial shock comovements across countries.  Therefore, we include an 
index of the degree of direct trade competition as used in Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001).  Second, 
we use two variables measuring the degree to which country i competes for funding from the same 
bank lenders as the crisis country, as proposed by Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001).
30  The first of 
these indices is based on the absolute value of credits obtained from the common lender, and the 
second is based on the share of borrowing from the common lender.  Due to the limited number of 
observations, we cannot include lists of potentially relevant macroeconomic fundamentals.
31 
                                                 
30 See “funds competition” in Table 1, p. 300 in Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001).  We are grateful to the authors for 
sharing their data with us.  (The Brazil crisis was not covered in their study and we constructed the data for this case.)  
31 We experimented with probabilities of currency crises as predicted by the early warning system used at the IMF and 
described in Berg and Pattillo (1999).  This variable summarizes the information contained in a variety of macroeconomic 
variables.  However, it is only available for a subset of countries in our sample, reducing our sample size further.  When 




Table 2b. Stock market returns during crises, including control variables 
 
  Thailand  Thailand  Thailand  Thailand  Thailand  Thailand  Thailand 
Financial Exposure  
(lagged) 
-0.368*** 










Trade Competition  - 
-0.551 
(0.387) 
-  - 
-0.366 
(0.275) 
-  - 
Competition for bank funds 
(share)  -  - 
-0.608 
(0.503) 




Competition for bank funds 
(absol.ute)  -  -  - 
0.319 
(0.334) 




2  0.28  0.13  0.11  0.04  0.33  0.28  0.37 
No. of  
obs. 
19  19  19  19  19  19  19 
 
  Russia  Russia  Russia  Russia  Russia  Russia  Russia 
Financial Exposure  
(lagged) 
-0.081** 






Trade Competition  - 
-3.996** 
(1.682) 
-  - 
-3.537* 
(1.923) 
-  - 
Competition for bank funds  
(share)  -  - 
-0.827*** 
(0.255) 




Competition for bank funds 
(absol.ute)  -  -  - 
-0.096 
(0.254) 




2  0.15  0.18  0.30  0.01  0.20  0.32  0.17 
No. of  
obs. 
19  18  19  19  18  19  19 
 
  Brazil  Brazil  Brazil  Brazil  Brazil  Brazil  Brazil 
Financial Exposure  
(lagged) 
-0.021* 






Trade Competition  -  -0.713*** 
(0.200)  -  -  -0.581** 
(0.250)  -  - 
Competition for bank  
Funds (share) 
-  -  0.001 
(0.137) 
-  -  0.013 
(0.138) 
- 
Competition for bank funds 
(absol.ute) 
-      -0.095 
(0.209)  -  -  0.078 
(0.284) 
R2  0.08  0.10  0.00  0.01  0.14  0.10  0.08 
No. of  
obs. 
21  21  21  21  21  21  21 
 
Notes: Stock market returns as a function of a country’s exposure to crisis countries.  The Thai 
crisis regression corresponds to cumulative returns during April 1997—August 1997, the Russian 
crisis regression to July 1998—September 1998, and the Brazilian crisis regression to January 
1999.  Includes only countries with an average weight in fund portfolios of at leas one percent.  




* means statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.  
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.  For the variables “trade competition” and 
“competition for bank funds” see Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001).  “Absolute” competition for 
bank funds is based on the value of credits obtained from the common lender, “share” is based on 




The small number of observations limits inference but some patterns are observable.  For the Thai 
crisis, none of the control variables are significant in explaining the pattern of the stock market reaction 
across countries, and the coefficient on our financial exposure variable remains broadly unchanged and 
statistically significant when including either control variable at a time.  For the Russian crisis, the 
trade variable is significant and alone explains a similar share of the total variance in stock returns.  
The “absolute” bank competition variable used by Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) for the Russian 
crisis does not enter significantly.  However, the “share”-based bank competition variable is significant, 
and explains 30 percent of stock returns variation.  When including both the financial exposure index 
and one of the two control variables at a time, the financial exposure index becomes insignificant when 
including the trade competition variable or the “share”-based bank competition index.  The financial 
exposure variable, does however, survive the inclusion of the “absolute” bank competition index.  For 
the Brazil crisis, the pattern is similar: trade linkages matter, and the financial interdependence variable 
remains statistically significant when controlling for bank linkages (which do not seem to matter) but 





We have shown that the portfolio choices of international funds depend on their past relative 
performance.  In particular, they respond to relative losses (gains) by moving closer (further away) to 
(from) the average portfolio.  These results are consistent with the hypothesis that fund managers’ 
effective risk aversion depends on their fund’s relative performance. 
This behavior by international funds can help explain why some countries are affected by financial 
market spillovers even if they do not seem to share fundamental weaknesses with crisis countries.  We 
constructed an index of financial interdependence reflecting the extent to which countries share 
“overexposed” funds.  We found that this index contributes to explain the pattern of stock returns 
during three crises.  In the case of the Thai crisis, it outperforms trade and bank linkages as explanatory 
variable, while for the Russian and Brazilian crises, trade linkages seem to be at least as important in 
explaining the extent to which other countries were affected.  These results suggest that our index of 
                                                 
32 Johnson et al (2000) have argued that corporate governance indices can help explain the pattern of stock market declines 
during the Asian crisis.  In a related vein, Gelos and Wei (2002), show that funds tend to avoid intransparent countries 




financial interdependence could be helpful in predicting which countries are likely to be affected by a 
crisis in a particular country. 
The tendency of mutual funds to reduce their overexposures in response to low relative 
performance may exacerbate the effect of crises, by creating both contagion between countries and 
momentum trading at the country level.  This prompts the question of whether countries should limit 
participation of international funds in their stock markets to index funds (i.e., funds that passively 
follow the index).  However, we believe that such a measure would likely be counterproductive.  
Information gathering by investors such as emerging market funds plays a useful role, and if all 
investors blindly followed indices, the indices themselves might become arbitrary, yielding herding in 
an extreme form.
33 
Lastly, the predictive power of our index of financial exposure based on international mutual funds 
likely reflects the fact that these funds are representative of other kinds of investors, such as 
commercial and investment banks.  In order to gain a more complete picture of the functioning of 
international capital markets, however, we hope that our research will be complemented in the future 
by similar examination of other market players’ behavior.
                                                 
33 This point has been made by Calvo and Mendoza (1999).  More generally, this question touches on one of the paradoxes 
of the efficient market hypothesis: if markets are efficient, it does not pay to gather information, but markets cannot be 
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Appendix I:  Fund performance and redemptions 
 
In the finance literature, the question of the relationship between past performance and risk taking by 
mutual funds has been studied repeatedly.  Initial studies pointed to the presence of “gambling 
behavior” by fund managers who fall behind in their performance (see Brown, Harlow, and Starks, 
1996, Chevalier and Ellison, 1997, and Sirri and Tufano, 1998).  One reason for such behavior might 
be that fund managers’ compensation rises with assets under management; if mutual funds with the 
best performance capture the lion’s share of new inflows while funds that perform poorly are not 
penalized equally, this might create an incentive for managers to choose more risky portfolios if they 
are falling behind.  
More recent studies, however, have questioned this hypothesis.  Busse (2001) finds that mid-year 
losers decrease their risk during the second half of a calendar year; Koski and Pontiff (1999) report a 
positive correlation between current risk taking and past-year performance.  Daniel and Wermers 
(2000) find that prior risk-taking behavior is a much better predictor than prior performance in 
explaining the future risk-taking behavior by fund managers.  Chen and Pennachi (2002) argue that 
while fund managers do increase the fund’s “tracking error” as its relative performance declines, this 
does not result in an increased variance of the fund’s returns. 
The incentives of dedicated emerging market funds have to our knowledge not yet been 
investigated in the literature, and a detailed analysis of this question is beyond the scope of this paper.  
One reason for this is that we do not have precise data about inflows, which we have to infer indirectly 
subtracting imputed fund gains from increases in reported size.  A look at the data for global funds 
(Figure A1) however, does not suggest the presence of incentives to gamble: the nonparametrically 
estimated relationship between excess inflows in a given quarter and past year’s excess inflows is 






Figure A1. Fund performance and inflows 
 
 
Note:  Local polynomial regression of excess inflows (in excess of average inflows across funds) in the first 
quarter of a year on past year’s excess return (in excess of average fund returns).  The estimation uses an 
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Appendix II:  Portfolio adjustment regressions with control variables 
 
Table A.1 shows the results of adding to our base regression changes in economic risk, financial risk, 
and political risk, both in levels and interacted with overexposure.  The table shows that these variables 
do not have any effect on the estimates of the coefficient we had previously estimated.  In addition, 
they are not statistically significant. 
 

















adjustment term  -  -  0.427
** 
(0.007) 

























































































# of observations  39,691  37,174  37,174 
2 R   0.02  0.03  0.11 
 
Notes:  Dependent variable: change in country weight. One observation per fund-time-country.  
All variables normalized by beginning of period fund size.  
***, 
**, and 
* means statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.  
￿
 denote first differences.  Economic, 
financial, and political risk refer to the International Country Risk Guide’s (ICRG) monthly 




Appendix III:  Equivalence of indices of interdependence 
 




c i i c c c oe re d
2 1 2 1 , , , , 
 










2 2 1 1
1
2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1
1




















































c i c i
i
c c i i
i


















b b b b s
b S
b b s b b s b b s b b s
b S










where we have used 
1 1 , c i c i b S a = ∑  in the first equality; 
1 1 , , c i i c i b s a = , 
2 2 , , c i i c i b s a = , and 
1 1 , c
i
c i b S a = ∑  in 
the second equality; and  ∑ =
i c i i c b s b S
1 1 , ,  ∑ =
i c i i c b s b S
2 2 , , and  ∑ =
i i s S  in the third equality. 
 